The document attached below is an excerpt of the primary document located at the Auckland City Library. This paper was written in February 1888, immediately after the rupture of the ANZUS alliance and hence after the creation of the nuclear-free legislation in New Zealand. The paper examines the issue of the "nuclear allergy" and what this meant for the relationship between New Zealand and America. There is also mention of a nuclear-free South Pacific legislation but I have prioritized the information regarding the dissipation of the ANZUS agreement as this was more significant to New Zealand at the time.
The analysis of the document begins below.
The analysis of the document begins below.
Your browser does not support viewing this document. Click here to download the document.
The following key ideas have been established using the source and its content. The reliability and usefulness is discussed later on in the dedicated pages.
The establishment of the 1984 policy against nuclear warships strained the alliance between America and New Zealand. When the Lange administration established the 1984 nuclear-free policy, which barred all nuclear warships and vessels from entering New Zealand ports, American officials instantly opposed this stance. The argument put forward by the Raegan administration was that for the ANZUS alliance between Australia, New Zealand and America to be effective there must be naval visits between the nations. This included the use of nuclear-powered ships. Although the policy had come into effect in 1984, the denial of the USS Buchanan visit under this policy in February 1985 enraged US officials further. The USS Buchanan was a nuclear-powered ship that carried anti-submarine weapons. The denial of the Buchanan was seen as unreasonable, where it was felt that New Zealand was effectively denying entrance to the ship that could possibly defend them in the event of an invasion. Although New Zealand was following its nuclear-free policy in denying the USS Buchanan entrance into its waters, American officials saw it as more of an attempt to ignore or challenge the United States. In America New Zealand was conveyed as being a 'free-rider' who did not accept the burdens of alliances but instead chose to only reap the benefits. As it was inconvenient for America to create an anti-nuclear navy there was emphasis on the need to exercise with the nuclear navy or not at all. Hence the initial strain placed on the alliance would result in deliberate actions to cut military ties between the nations.
The New Zealand military alliance with America was ended following the denial of the USS Buchanan. Soon after the denial of the warship USS Buchanan, Washington cut all military ties with New Zealand. This included the ceasing of military exchange visits, naval exercises and access to military intelligence. This occurred almost immediately, however the core of the ANZUS pact remained intact until 1986, where America withdrew all its security commitments to New Zealand. ANZUS therefore became ineffective and essentially inoperable as there were only two nations secured within the alliance. Australia did not support New Zealand's stance on nuclear energy. Not only were military ties severed, but New Zealand was infamously downgraded from an 'ally' to a 'friend' of the United States. The Raegan administration even expanded its action against the 'free-riding' New Zealand by placing a legal ban on its arms export to the nation.
The deliberate actions to cut military ties with New Zealand can be contextualised as being part of a growing 'nuclear allergy' and the stance against communism. Although America was traditionally an ally of New Zealand, more of its response can be explained with the Raegan Administration's fear of the spread of the 'nuclear allergy' . This term had been used to describe the manifestation of anti-nuclear politics that were developing, mainly in the West. This opposition was aimed at superpower nations using nuclear energy. The American concern with this phenomenon was particularly prevalent in the 1980s, where it was feared that more countries would oppose American global policies and/or the use of nuclear energy. Greece was another country currently threatening to prevent American bases on its soil. Throughout the OECD (The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) there were also peace movements directly opposing the use of nuclear energy. Thus it can be understood that the US reaction to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy was more than frustration at not being able to exercise their navy, but rather it was an attempt to show other nations that if they followed suit with New Zealand then they too will be ostracised from America. It had been suggested that if New Zealand was able to carry on being aligned to the US with the benefits of the defence pact even with the nuclear-free policy, then other nations might follow their example and prevent nuclear usage in their territories. It was thus essential for the USA to control the 'nuclear-allergy' before it spread to other, more important allies. Similarly, if the nations were seen to be rebelling or opposing American policy then this would send signals to the growing communist front of a weakening Western resolve, something which the government could not afford given the current climate of opportunistic communist expansion.
There were significant costs involved with the ANZUS rupture, particularly to New Zealand. Although the anti-nuclear policy and hence the Lange government remained popular within New Zealand, many people felt they had been unjustly treated by American in regards to the ANZUS alliance. These people included the armed forces in New Zealand, who were negatively impacted by the end of the American alliance. The operational capabilities of the NZ Navy were heavily restricted, where it has been states that there were 22 joint exercises that had to either be cancelled or restructured in 1985. Another consequence established in the article is the effective isolation of New Zealand after the ANZUS rupture. Even if it were to be eventually repaired, it is argued that it is unlikely to return to its original state after the events on the late 1980s. The lack of communication during the period of the rupture is likely to decrease the capability of the two nations to communicate in the long term. Therefore the argument established from the point of view of Andrew Mack is that there were considerable consequences of the anti-nuclear policy for New Zealand, where his contemporary viewpoint leaned toward the negative impact on communication between the two countries.
The reliability of this source will be discussed further in the source reliability page.
The establishment of the 1984 policy against nuclear warships strained the alliance between America and New Zealand. When the Lange administration established the 1984 nuclear-free policy, which barred all nuclear warships and vessels from entering New Zealand ports, American officials instantly opposed this stance. The argument put forward by the Raegan administration was that for the ANZUS alliance between Australia, New Zealand and America to be effective there must be naval visits between the nations. This included the use of nuclear-powered ships. Although the policy had come into effect in 1984, the denial of the USS Buchanan visit under this policy in February 1985 enraged US officials further. The USS Buchanan was a nuclear-powered ship that carried anti-submarine weapons. The denial of the Buchanan was seen as unreasonable, where it was felt that New Zealand was effectively denying entrance to the ship that could possibly defend them in the event of an invasion. Although New Zealand was following its nuclear-free policy in denying the USS Buchanan entrance into its waters, American officials saw it as more of an attempt to ignore or challenge the United States. In America New Zealand was conveyed as being a 'free-rider' who did not accept the burdens of alliances but instead chose to only reap the benefits. As it was inconvenient for America to create an anti-nuclear navy there was emphasis on the need to exercise with the nuclear navy or not at all. Hence the initial strain placed on the alliance would result in deliberate actions to cut military ties between the nations.
The New Zealand military alliance with America was ended following the denial of the USS Buchanan. Soon after the denial of the warship USS Buchanan, Washington cut all military ties with New Zealand. This included the ceasing of military exchange visits, naval exercises and access to military intelligence. This occurred almost immediately, however the core of the ANZUS pact remained intact until 1986, where America withdrew all its security commitments to New Zealand. ANZUS therefore became ineffective and essentially inoperable as there were only two nations secured within the alliance. Australia did not support New Zealand's stance on nuclear energy. Not only were military ties severed, but New Zealand was infamously downgraded from an 'ally' to a 'friend' of the United States. The Raegan administration even expanded its action against the 'free-riding' New Zealand by placing a legal ban on its arms export to the nation.
The deliberate actions to cut military ties with New Zealand can be contextualised as being part of a growing 'nuclear allergy' and the stance against communism. Although America was traditionally an ally of New Zealand, more of its response can be explained with the Raegan Administration's fear of the spread of the 'nuclear allergy' . This term had been used to describe the manifestation of anti-nuclear politics that were developing, mainly in the West. This opposition was aimed at superpower nations using nuclear energy. The American concern with this phenomenon was particularly prevalent in the 1980s, where it was feared that more countries would oppose American global policies and/or the use of nuclear energy. Greece was another country currently threatening to prevent American bases on its soil. Throughout the OECD (The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) there were also peace movements directly opposing the use of nuclear energy. Thus it can be understood that the US reaction to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy was more than frustration at not being able to exercise their navy, but rather it was an attempt to show other nations that if they followed suit with New Zealand then they too will be ostracised from America. It had been suggested that if New Zealand was able to carry on being aligned to the US with the benefits of the defence pact even with the nuclear-free policy, then other nations might follow their example and prevent nuclear usage in their territories. It was thus essential for the USA to control the 'nuclear-allergy' before it spread to other, more important allies. Similarly, if the nations were seen to be rebelling or opposing American policy then this would send signals to the growing communist front of a weakening Western resolve, something which the government could not afford given the current climate of opportunistic communist expansion.
There were significant costs involved with the ANZUS rupture, particularly to New Zealand. Although the anti-nuclear policy and hence the Lange government remained popular within New Zealand, many people felt they had been unjustly treated by American in regards to the ANZUS alliance. These people included the armed forces in New Zealand, who were negatively impacted by the end of the American alliance. The operational capabilities of the NZ Navy were heavily restricted, where it has been states that there were 22 joint exercises that had to either be cancelled or restructured in 1985. Another consequence established in the article is the effective isolation of New Zealand after the ANZUS rupture. Even if it were to be eventually repaired, it is argued that it is unlikely to return to its original state after the events on the late 1980s. The lack of communication during the period of the rupture is likely to decrease the capability of the two nations to communicate in the long term. Therefore the argument established from the point of view of Andrew Mack is that there were considerable consequences of the anti-nuclear policy for New Zealand, where his contemporary viewpoint leaned toward the negative impact on communication between the two countries.
The reliability of this source will be discussed further in the source reliability page.
![Picture](/uploads/3/7/9/0/37901579/9258227_orig.jpg)
The use of anti-nuclear posters strengthened the impact of the movement as it allowed ideas to be expressed and spread throughout New Zealand relatively quickly. This particular poster is one printed by Peace Squadron, who were advertising one of their protests against nuclear warships, in particular the USS Haddo. Similar protest posters were created and published in order to generate negative publicity and anxiety over nuclear energy and also to encourage ordinary civilians to join the protests that were being staged at various times.
![Picture](/uploads/3/7/9/0/37901579/9120239_orig.jpg)
This poster is an example of the negative publicity generated from the use of nuclear energy. Deliberate emotional triggers are used to aid in creating resent towards the use of nuclear power and the arrival of nuclear warships in New Zealand. This can also have relevance to the possibility of an accident with the testing in the Pacific, where it was probable that nuclear waste could leak into the ocean. Hence posters such as these were used to create a feeling of anxiety and fear. Tactics such as these were effective in drawing support for a
nuclear-free New Zealand.